AlleyCat
2024-05-22 17:06:49 UTC
On Wed, 22 May 2024 08:55:46 -0700, Rudy Canoza says...
Fact check: Evidence disproves claims of Russian/Trump conspiracy to meddle in U.S.
election (known as #RussiaGate)
The whole thing is typically unhinged left-wingnut bullshit.
Russia has been "meddling" in our elections since the year before Trump was even born, psycho.
=====
Soviet Meddling in 1984 U.S. Presidential Election[3]
Caption: This is a memorandum from National Security Council staffer John Lenczowski to Deputy National
Security Advisor John Poindexter. It was dated August 16, 1984, and expressed alarm at Soviet efforts to
intervene in U.S. domestic politics and oppose the re-election of Ronald Reagan.
=====
Soviet Active Measures against the "Main Enemy"
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union established a global influence campaign, referred to as aktivnyye
meropriyatiya-or "active measures."4 They included such activities as disinformation (or dezinformatsiya),
forgeries, agents of influence, front groups, and targeted assassinations.5 These efforts were "active" in
the sense that they could take on a life of their own, and disinformation might eventually spread throughout
newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and other media forums without additional Soviet involvement. [For
example, a KGB forgery might accuse the United States of plotting to kill a foreign government official. Yet
even after the U.S. government or one of its allies exposed the document as a forgery, the content might
still be repeated in other sources around the globe. 6] Soviet active measures focused primarily on the
United States, which it referred to as the "main enemy" (or glavnyy protivnik), though Moscow also targeted
U.S. allies.7 As one former Warsaw Pact intelligence operative noted:
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union established a global influence campaign, referred to as aktivnyye
meropriyatiya-or "active measures."
Target No. 1 was the United States ... The objective was to hurt the United States wherever and whenever it
was possible, to weaken the positions of the United States and Western Europe, to create new rifts within the
NATO Alliance, to weaken the position of the United States in developing countries, to cause new rifts
between the United States and developing countries, to disinform the United States and the Western allies
about the military strength of the Soviet bloc countries.8
The Soviets had multiple goals in conducting active measures, such as undermining support in the United
States and overseas for policies viewed as threatening to Moscow, discrediting U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, weakening U.S. alliances and U.S. relations with partners, and increasing Soviet power
and influence across the globe.9 Many of these objectives are remarkably similar to Russia's goals today.
Soviet activities were hierarchical and adaptive. "Almost everything is considered at the center, in Moscow,
and it is worked up in aspects of Soviet foreign security policy," one CIA operative explained during
Congressional testimony. "So the Soviets are in a position to react and act quickly if it is something that
is in their game plan." 10 The Soviets established centralized organizations-such as the International
Department (ID) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the International Information Department
(IID) of the CPSU, and Service A of the KGB's First Chief Directorate-to direct propaganda and other active
measures.11 These organizations were supervised by the Politburo. The KGB's Service A planned, coordinated,
and supported operations which were designed to backstop overt Soviet propaganda using forgeries, printed
press articles, planted rumors, disinformation, and controlled information media. Given the importance of
propaganda and covert action in its foreign policy, the USSR was willing to spend large sums of money on its
programs-over $3 billion per year by the 1980s, according to CIA estimates.12
The aggressiveness of active measures was not constant but tended to ebb and flow depending on factors like
the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. During periods of détente, there was often a decrease in the number and
types of active measures.13 In the early 1970s, for example, Soviet active measures were limited because of a
thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations. In addition, the Soviets concluded that U.S. scandals-especially Watergate-
meant that Moscow didn't need to devote as much time and resources to active measures. U.S. domestic scandals
were sufficient to discredit the country. As one Czech intelligence official noted, "The Watergate scandal
and the following investigation of U.S. intelligence activities supplied the American as well as foreign mass
media with such an enormous volume of damaging information that forgeries were not necessary."14
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, [there was heightened U.S.-Soviet competition] because of
tensions over Angola, Soviet unhappiness with the state of arms control negotiations, the U.S. decision to
support the mujahideen following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the election of U.S. President
Ronald Reagan. As one CIA analyst concluded, "we assumed that there was a reevaluation from the Soviet
perspective in that period, that things weren't going their way and perhaps it was time from them to engage
in more direct ideological conflict with the United States."15
A History of Meddling in U.S. Elections
One component of active measures was attempting to influence U.S. political campaigns. Well before the
election of Ronald Reagan, the KGB and intelligence agencies from countries like Czechoslovakia (now the
Czech Republic and Slovakia) in the Warsaw Pact-the Cold War military alliance that included the Soviet Union
and countries in Eastern and Central Europe-attempted to influence U.S. politics. In the 1960s, for example,
the intelligence service from Czechoslovakia ran a propaganda campaign against U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater,
the Republican candidate for U.S. president. Moscow was deeply concerned about Goldwater's anti-Soviet views,
and Soviet and Czechoslovak agencies orchestrated a disinformation campaign labeling Goldwater as a racist
and a KKK sympathizer. They produced and distributed printed material in the United States and overseas. "It
was sent to many journalists and politicians," recalled one former Czechoslovak intelligence official. "I
think the result was much more successful in developing countries than here in the United States."16 Still
Goldwater lost the 1964 presidential election campaign in a landslide to Lyndon Johnson.
Then presidential hopeful Barry Goldwater (R) and his running mate William Miller accepting the Republican
Party nomination in San Francisco. Source: AFP/AFP/Getty Images
In the 1968 presidential election, the Soviet leadership and the KGB strongly opposed the anti-Communist
Richard Nixon and secretly offered to subsidize the campaign of Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic nominee.
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, recalled that "the top Soviet leaders took an
extraordinary step, unprecedented in the history of Soviet-American relations, by secretly offering Humphrey
any conceivable help in his election campaign-including financial aid."17 Humphrey rejected the Soviet offer
and eventually lost the presidential election, but it was a stunning example of Moscow's attempt to directly
influence a presidential campaign.
In the 1968 presidential election, the Soviet leadership and the KGB strongly opposed the anti-Communist
Richard Nixon and secretly offered to subsidize the campaign of Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic nominee.
In 1976, Service A of the KGB again adopted active measures to disparage Democratic Senator Henry "Scoop"
Jackson, an anti-Soviet hawk, in the presidential election. As Harvard historian Mark Kramer noted, "Service
A prepared a wide-ranging set of measures to discredit Jackson, especially by falsely portraying him as a
homosexual. The KGB sent forged FBI letters to leading U.S. newspapers and journalists claiming that Jackson
was a closet gay."18 Service A codenamed the operation POROK. For instance, the KGB forged an FBI memorandum
dated June 20, 1940 which was allegedly from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and concluded that Jackson was gay.
Service A distributed the memorandum to the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Topeka Capital, and Jimmy
Carter's Democratic campaign headquarters.19 In the end, Jimmy Carter beat out Jackson for the Democratic
nomination, much to Moscow's relief.
While the Soviets may not have liked Goldwater, Nixon, or even Jackson, Ronald Reagan was in a whole
different category for Soviet leaders. As Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin concluded following their
review of top-secret KGB documents, "Service A [of the KGB] was ordered to embark on a remarkably wide-
ranging quest for compromising material" on Reagan. "Probably no American policymaker at any time during the
Cold War," they assessed, "inspired quite as much fear and loathing in Moscow as Ronald Reagan during his
first term as president."20
The KGB hunted for compromising material on Reagan and planted articles in Denmark, France, and India during
Reagan's failed 1976 presidential campaign.21 However, during Reagan's 1980 election campaign, the KGB did
not become involved in a major disinformation effort, in part because they saw little difference between a
strongly anti-Soviet Reagan and a Carter administration dominated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's anti-
Soviet national security advisor. It was a decision the KGB would quickly regret. As Andrew and Mitrokhin
wrote, "Ensuring that Reagan did not serve a second term thus became Service A's most important objective."22
On February 25, 1983, KGB headquarters instructed agents in the United States to start planning activities to
defeat Reagan in the 1984 presidential election. Headquarters requested that KGB agents establish contacts on
the staffs of every presidential candidate and in the Republican and Democratic party headquarters. KGB
leaders asked residences abroad to send agents to take part in the operation in the United States. KGB
headquarters made clear that any Republican or Democratic candidate-other than Reagan-would be preferable.23
As one classified CIA report concluded, "Moscow would rather deal with a new administration, even though
uncertain about its actual policies, than carry on with the present [Reagan] one."24 The Soviets'
disinformation campaign was designed to discredit Reagan by labeling him as a warmonger and arguing that re-
electing him would be a grave mistake.25]
On February 25, 1983, KGB headquarters instructed agents in the United States to start planning activities to
defeat Reagan in the 1984 presidential election.
U.S.President and Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy wave to supporters at an
electoral meeting in November 1984. Source: DON RYPKA/AFP/Getty Images
In addition to placing sources inside the campaigns, the KGB worked with front groups and agents of
influence-such as pro-Soviet journalists-in the United States to disparage Reagan. Examples included the
Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) and its front groups, such as the United States Peace Council (USPC) and
the National Council of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF). The Soviets relied on these groups to support
active measures and propaganda campaigns, and KGB officers were in frequent contact with officials from these
groups.26 As the FBI assessed, "[The Soviets] utilized their front organizations and publications to attempt
to convince the U.S. public that the reelection of President Reagan would be a grave mistake and would have
significant political and economic ramifications."27 Inside the United States, the KGB active measures
campaign alleged that Reagan discriminated against minorities, that his administration was corrupt, and that
he was too closely tied to the military-industrial complex. Outside of the United States, the KGB campaign
painted Reagan as a war hawk who was engineering an arms race and catapulting the United States and Soviet
Union toward nuclear Armageddon.28
Reagan officials-along with U.S. intelligence agencies-were acutely aware of KGB planning and activities to
influence the 1984 election. As one classified White House report concluded, "The Administration is harboring
a growing concern about Soviet attempts to intervene in the American election process and the effects this
has on the international climate."29 KGB efforts, the memo pointed out, came on the heels of Soviet attempts
to influence the 1983 election in Germany and Great Britain. For the United States, however, Moscow was
willing to dedicate significant time and money. "Altogether, the Soviets devote a massive amount of resources
to influence American voters over the heads of the government," the memo concluded. "Their activities not
only constitute intervention into the internal affairs of our country, but have done a great deal to
aggravate the international climate."30 A classified CIA assessment concluded that the Soviet grasp of the
U.S. political system had improved over the years, which meant that "the Soviet capacity for influencing
[American] votes is higher."31
As the KGB discovered following Reagan's landslide victory in 1984, however, its ability to influence a
popular president was limited. But it didn't stop them from trying to influence U.S. politics in the late
1980s. As one FBI report concluded, "Soviet intelligence officers have already started to collect information
on the 1988 Presidential candidates and their positions on various issues." These operations targeted
"Congressmen and other elected officials by front organizations, agents of influence, Soviet influenced
organizations, and the CPUSA."32
By the early 1990s, however, Russian active measures went into a deep thaw as the Soviet Union collapsed, the
KGB was in disarray, and Moscow lost its Warsaw Pact allies to the expansion of NATO and the European Union.
Back to the Future
The Mueller report's conclusion that Russia was involved in an aggressive influence campaign against the
United States at home and abroad is deeply concerning. But it needs to be viewed as a continuation of
Moscow's strategic competition with the United States. Nearly three decades after the Soviet Union's breakup,
Vladimir Putin is attempting to re-establish Russia as a global power and compete with the United States.
An FBI assessment of KGB active measures, released in 1987, is just as relevant today as it was then in its
explanation of Moscow's goals:
Although it is often difficult to judge the effectiveness of specific active measures operations, the Soviets
believe these operations have a cumulative effect and are detrimental to U.S. foreign policy and national
security interests. Furthermore, the Soviets believe that their active measures operations in the United
States do contribute to their overall strategy to advance Soviet foreign policy interests, influence U.S.
government policies, and in general discredit the United States.33
Russia's campaign before, during, and after the 2016 election suggests several themes. First, it is an
interesting historical twist that Moscow shifted its active measures campaign from demonizing Republican
candidates to supporting a Republican presidential nominee in Donald Trump. To be clear, Moscow has never
been motivated per se by U.S. political parties, but rather supported U.S. presidential candidates,
politicians, and issues that Russian leaders assessed would benefit its policies. As one classified White
House memo concluded in 1984, "The principal method by which the Soviets attempt to influence American voters
is by campaigning against the candidate and the Party they don't like."34 This is just as true today. Moscow
apparently concluded that Trump was more friendly to Russia and its policies than Hillary Clinton. Americans
should see Russian actions for what they are: an effort to increase their influence at America's expense.
Moscow has never been motivated per se by U.S. political parties, but rather supported U.S. presidential
candidates, politicians, and issues that Russian leaders assessed would benefit its policies.
Second, Russian active measures today are about much more than the 2016 U.S. election. They are about
strategic balance-of-power competition with the United States. Russia employs a mix of technologically-
sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities, covert action, and information operations in an attempt to expand
its power and compete with the United States. Moscow has implemented overt information campaigns using
platforms like RT and Sputnik. It has also conducted covert campaigns to support influential figures and
opposition political parties in the United States and Europe; waged offensive cyber campaigns against the
United States, France, Germany, and other NATO countries; and supported proxies in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, and
Afghanistan to increase its power in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and even Africa. In 2019, Russia even
deployed soldiers and provided military equipment to Venezuela, a country that has historically been in
Washington's sphere of influence dating back to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.
U.S. national security documents have highlighted Russian goals. The U.S. National Defense Strategy, for
example, notes that the United States is engaged in inter-state competition with countries like China and
Russia. "Russia," it argues, "seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their
governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor."35The Director of National
Intelligence's 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessments bluntly concluded that: "Threats to US national security
will expand and diversify in the coming year, driven in part by China and Russia as they respectively compete
more intensely with the United States and its traditional allies and partners."36 The Mueller report's
conclusions support these assessments.
Third, Moscow likely believes its intelligence efforts today are helping undermine U.S. foreign and domestic
policy by exploiting a polarized American political climate, exacerbating U.S. fissures with its allies in
Europe and Asia, and contributing to a decline in American global power and influence. The United States
needs to avoid devolving into the hysteria of the McCarthy years during the 1950s, which included a broad
campaign against alleged Communists in the U.S. government and other institutions carried out under Senator
Joseph McCarthy. Yet there are legitimate threats from countries like Russia and China. It is striking and
unfortunate that U.S. leaders, including the U.S. president, have not vowed to aggressively respond to
Russian meddling in U.S. domestic politics based on the Mueller findings. Without a tough response, like
Reagan did during the Cold War, it is unlikely that Moscow will be deterred from interfering again in the
future.
The Mueller report highlights that the United States faces a range of threats from adversaries like Russia-
along with others, like China. These U.S. adversaries are undemocratic; their populations have little or no
say in electing leaders. Their officials support state-run economies, not free markets. Their governments
control the media and abhor a free press. And they are directly challenging a U.S.-led international order
since World War II that has been committed to free market international economic institutions, bilateral and
regional security organizations, and democratic political norms.
U.S. enemies are not just at the gate, they are inside it. Americans need to put aside party policies and
confront these threats to freedom and democracy.
CSIS collected these and other declassified U.S. government documents on Soviet interference in U.S.
elections from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, and the CIA Records Search
Tool (CREST) database at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.
? Memorandum from John Lenczowski to John M. Poindexter, Subject: Statement on Soviet Intervention in the
U.S. Electoral Process, August 16, 1984, USSR (8/16/84-8/18/84), Box 25A, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country
File: Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.
? Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87," CIA-
RDP11M01338R000400470089-2, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration, College
Park, MD.
? Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Soviet Expectations for the U.S. Presidential
Election," January 31, 1984, CIA-RDP85T00287R001400370002-7, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and
Records Administration, College Park, MD.
? Memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE to the Director of Central Intelligence and
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Soviets Playing on U.S. Election, August 1, 1984, CIA-
RDP86M0086R001000010026-5, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration, College
Park, MD.
? Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: The Soviets and the 1984 U.S. Elections,
October 28, 1982, CIA-RDP85T00153R000300020043-0, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park, MD.
Seth G. Jones is the Harold Brown Chair and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is the author, most recently, of "A Covert Action: Reagan, the
CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland" (W.W. Norton).
The author gives special thanks to Jacob Ware and Nicholas Harrington for assistance in collecting and
analyzing data.
This brief is made possible by the generous support of CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this
report.
CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt
institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary.
CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in
this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
1Letter from Attorney General William P. Barr to the Honorable Lindsey Graham, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein, the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, and the Honorable Doug Collins, March 24, 2019.
2Ibid.
3Memorandum from John Lenczowski to John M. Poindexter, Subject: Statement on Soviet Intervention in the U.S.
Electoral Process, August 16, 1984, USSR (8/16/84-8/18/84), Box 25A, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Coun-try
File: Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 3.
4"Report by the Chairman of the Delegation of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, General-
Colonel V.M. Chebrikov during Soviet Bloc Meeting on Western Radio," April 23, 1980, History and Public
Policy Program Digital Archive, Cold War International History Project,
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121522 . Also see "Soviet Active Measures," Hearings Before
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, July 13, 14, 1982 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 231.
5Statement of John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Covert
Action (The Forgery Offensive)," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, February 6, 19, 1980 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980), 6.
6United States Department of State, Sov iet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda,
1986-1987 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, August 1987), viii.
7See, for example, the testimony of former KGB operative Stanislav Levchenko in "Soviet Active Measures," in
"Soviet Active Measures," Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
8Statement of Ladislav Bittman, Former Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak
Intelligence Service, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 43-44.
9Interagency Intelligence Study, "Soviet Active Measures," included in "Soviet Active Measures," Hearings
Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
10"Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 30. Emphasis added.
11See, for example, "A Directive form the Centre," Folder 79, The Chekist Anthology, April 25, 1974, History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to Cold War International History Project by Vasili
Mitrokhin.
12Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda," 1980, available in "Soviet Covert
Action (The Forgery Offensive)," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, 60; Statement of John McMahon, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 7.
13As one CIA analyst concluded: "There is a precedent for the stand-down during a period of high détente."
Testimony of James R. Benjamin available in Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery
Offensive)," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
14Statement of Ladislav Bittman, Former Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak
Intelligence Service, ibid., 37-38.
15Testimony of James R. Benjamin, ibid.
16Statement of Ladislav Bittman, Former Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak
Intelligence Service, ibid., 51.
17Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Random
House, 1995), 176. Emphasis added.
18See, for example, Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Roots of Meddling in U.S. Politics," PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo
No. 452, January 2017, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm452
_Kramer_Jan2017.pdf.
19Mitrokhin Archives, vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1. Available in the Churchill Archives at Churchill College,
Cambridge, UK.
20Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret
History of the KGB (New York: Basic Book, 1999), 243.
21Mitrokhin Archives, vol. 6, app. 1, parts 27, 32. Available in the Churchill Archives at Churchill College,
Cambridge, UK. Also see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 242.
22Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 243. Emphasis added.
23Ibid.
24Memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE to the Director of Central Intelligence and
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Soviets Playing on U.S. Election, August 1, 1984, CIA-
RDP86M0086R001000010026-5, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration, College
Park, MD [hereafter CREST].
25Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87," CIA-
RDP11M01338R000400470089-2, CREST.
26Memorandum from Nicholas Platt to VADM John M. Poindexter, Subject: Report to Congress on Soviet and
Communist Disinformation and Press Manipulation, August 9, 1986, [Project Truth, Project Democracy, Public
Diplomacy and NED, 7/86-8/86], Box 7, Walter Raymond files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library [hereafter
RRPL].
27"Soviet Active Measures in the United States-an Updated Report by the FBI," Congressional Record, December
9, 1987, available at CIA-RDP11M01338R000400470089-2, CREST.
28Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 243.
29Memorandum from John Lenczowski to John M. Poindexter, Subject: Statement on Soviet Intervention in the
U.S. Electoral Process, August 16, 1984, USSR (8/16/84-8/18/84), Box 25A, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country
File: Records, RRPL.
30bid.
31Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: The Soviets and the 1984 U.S. Elections,
October 28, 1982, CIA-RDP85T00153R000300020043-0, CREST.
32Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87," CIA-
RDP11M01338R000400470089-2, CREST.
33Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87," CREST.
34Memorandum from Lenczowski to Poindexter, August 16, 1984, RRPL.
35 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Defense, 2018), 2.
36Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of
the Director of National Intelligence), 4.
=====
AlleyCat is one of the several people who dominate Rudy on a daily basis, keeping their bootheels on his
little pencil neck to the amusement of all.
Rudy's psychosis is characterized by an impaired relationship with reality.
It's a symptom of serious mental disorders. People who are experiencing
psychosis may have delusions.
The person experiencing psychosis may also have thoughts that are contrary to
actual EVIDENCE.
These thoughts are known as delusions. Some people with psychosis may also
experience loss of motivation and social withdrawal.
(like spending ALL day on Usenet, instead of socially interacting)
These experiences can be frightening. They may also cause people who are
experiencing psychosis to hurt themselves or others.
"I can kill you with one hand. You know this."
"Thanks for kicking my faggot ass."
"I've beaten you to a bloody pulp"
"... you you no-fight faggot."
"Kicked your flabby faggot ass again. Yes."
It's important to see a doctor right away if you or someone you know is
experiencing symptoms of psychosis.
Symptoms of psychosis include:
depressed mood
sleeping too much or not enough
anxiety
suspiciousness
withdrawal from family and friends
delusions
disorganized speech, such as switching topics erratically
depression
suicidal thoughts or actions
A delusion is a false belief or impression that is firmly held even though it's
contradicted by reality and what is commonly considered true. There are
delusions of paranoia, grandiose delusions, and somatic delusions.
People who are experiencing a delusion of paranoia might think that they are
being followed when they aren't or that secret messages are being sent to them.
Someone with a grandiose delusion will have an exaggerated sense of importance.
Somatic delusion is when a person believes they have a terminal illness, but in
reality they're healthy.
Fact check: Evidence disproves claims of Russian/Trump conspiracy to meddle in U.S.
election (known as #RussiaGate)
The whole thing is typically unhinged left-wingnut bullshit.
Russia has been "meddling" in our elections since the year before Trump was even born, psycho.
=====
Soviet Meddling in 1984 U.S. Presidential Election[3]
Caption: This is a memorandum from National Security Council staffer John Lenczowski to Deputy National
Security Advisor John Poindexter. It was dated August 16, 1984, and expressed alarm at Soviet efforts to
intervene in U.S. domestic politics and oppose the re-election of Ronald Reagan.
=====
Soviet Active Measures against the "Main Enemy"
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union established a global influence campaign, referred to as aktivnyye
meropriyatiya-or "active measures."4 They included such activities as disinformation (or dezinformatsiya),
forgeries, agents of influence, front groups, and targeted assassinations.5 These efforts were "active" in
the sense that they could take on a life of their own, and disinformation might eventually spread throughout
newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and other media forums without additional Soviet involvement. [For
example, a KGB forgery might accuse the United States of plotting to kill a foreign government official. Yet
even after the U.S. government or one of its allies exposed the document as a forgery, the content might
still be repeated in other sources around the globe. 6] Soviet active measures focused primarily on the
United States, which it referred to as the "main enemy" (or glavnyy protivnik), though Moscow also targeted
U.S. allies.7 As one former Warsaw Pact intelligence operative noted:
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union established a global influence campaign, referred to as aktivnyye
meropriyatiya-or "active measures."
Target No. 1 was the United States ... The objective was to hurt the United States wherever and whenever it
was possible, to weaken the positions of the United States and Western Europe, to create new rifts within the
NATO Alliance, to weaken the position of the United States in developing countries, to cause new rifts
between the United States and developing countries, to disinform the United States and the Western allies
about the military strength of the Soviet bloc countries.8
The Soviets had multiple goals in conducting active measures, such as undermining support in the United
States and overseas for policies viewed as threatening to Moscow, discrediting U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, weakening U.S. alliances and U.S. relations with partners, and increasing Soviet power
and influence across the globe.9 Many of these objectives are remarkably similar to Russia's goals today.
Soviet activities were hierarchical and adaptive. "Almost everything is considered at the center, in Moscow,
and it is worked up in aspects of Soviet foreign security policy," one CIA operative explained during
Congressional testimony. "So the Soviets are in a position to react and act quickly if it is something that
is in their game plan." 10 The Soviets established centralized organizations-such as the International
Department (ID) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the International Information Department
(IID) of the CPSU, and Service A of the KGB's First Chief Directorate-to direct propaganda and other active
measures.11 These organizations were supervised by the Politburo. The KGB's Service A planned, coordinated,
and supported operations which were designed to backstop overt Soviet propaganda using forgeries, printed
press articles, planted rumors, disinformation, and controlled information media. Given the importance of
propaganda and covert action in its foreign policy, the USSR was willing to spend large sums of money on its
programs-over $3 billion per year by the 1980s, according to CIA estimates.12
The aggressiveness of active measures was not constant but tended to ebb and flow depending on factors like
the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. During periods of détente, there was often a decrease in the number and
types of active measures.13 In the early 1970s, for example, Soviet active measures were limited because of a
thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations. In addition, the Soviets concluded that U.S. scandals-especially Watergate-
meant that Moscow didn't need to devote as much time and resources to active measures. U.S. domestic scandals
were sufficient to discredit the country. As one Czech intelligence official noted, "The Watergate scandal
and the following investigation of U.S. intelligence activities supplied the American as well as foreign mass
media with such an enormous volume of damaging information that forgeries were not necessary."14
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, [there was heightened U.S.-Soviet competition] because of
tensions over Angola, Soviet unhappiness with the state of arms control negotiations, the U.S. decision to
support the mujahideen following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the election of U.S. President
Ronald Reagan. As one CIA analyst concluded, "we assumed that there was a reevaluation from the Soviet
perspective in that period, that things weren't going their way and perhaps it was time from them to engage
in more direct ideological conflict with the United States."15
A History of Meddling in U.S. Elections
One component of active measures was attempting to influence U.S. political campaigns. Well before the
election of Ronald Reagan, the KGB and intelligence agencies from countries like Czechoslovakia (now the
Czech Republic and Slovakia) in the Warsaw Pact-the Cold War military alliance that included the Soviet Union
and countries in Eastern and Central Europe-attempted to influence U.S. politics. In the 1960s, for example,
the intelligence service from Czechoslovakia ran a propaganda campaign against U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater,
the Republican candidate for U.S. president. Moscow was deeply concerned about Goldwater's anti-Soviet views,
and Soviet and Czechoslovak agencies orchestrated a disinformation campaign labeling Goldwater as a racist
and a KKK sympathizer. They produced and distributed printed material in the United States and overseas. "It
was sent to many journalists and politicians," recalled one former Czechoslovak intelligence official. "I
think the result was much more successful in developing countries than here in the United States."16 Still
Goldwater lost the 1964 presidential election campaign in a landslide to Lyndon Johnson.
Then presidential hopeful Barry Goldwater (R) and his running mate William Miller accepting the Republican
Party nomination in San Francisco. Source: AFP/AFP/Getty Images
In the 1968 presidential election, the Soviet leadership and the KGB strongly opposed the anti-Communist
Richard Nixon and secretly offered to subsidize the campaign of Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic nominee.
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, recalled that "the top Soviet leaders took an
extraordinary step, unprecedented in the history of Soviet-American relations, by secretly offering Humphrey
any conceivable help in his election campaign-including financial aid."17 Humphrey rejected the Soviet offer
and eventually lost the presidential election, but it was a stunning example of Moscow's attempt to directly
influence a presidential campaign.
In the 1968 presidential election, the Soviet leadership and the KGB strongly opposed the anti-Communist
Richard Nixon and secretly offered to subsidize the campaign of Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic nominee.
In 1976, Service A of the KGB again adopted active measures to disparage Democratic Senator Henry "Scoop"
Jackson, an anti-Soviet hawk, in the presidential election. As Harvard historian Mark Kramer noted, "Service
A prepared a wide-ranging set of measures to discredit Jackson, especially by falsely portraying him as a
homosexual. The KGB sent forged FBI letters to leading U.S. newspapers and journalists claiming that Jackson
was a closet gay."18 Service A codenamed the operation POROK. For instance, the KGB forged an FBI memorandum
dated June 20, 1940 which was allegedly from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and concluded that Jackson was gay.
Service A distributed the memorandum to the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Topeka Capital, and Jimmy
Carter's Democratic campaign headquarters.19 In the end, Jimmy Carter beat out Jackson for the Democratic
nomination, much to Moscow's relief.
While the Soviets may not have liked Goldwater, Nixon, or even Jackson, Ronald Reagan was in a whole
different category for Soviet leaders. As Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin concluded following their
review of top-secret KGB documents, "Service A [of the KGB] was ordered to embark on a remarkably wide-
ranging quest for compromising material" on Reagan. "Probably no American policymaker at any time during the
Cold War," they assessed, "inspired quite as much fear and loathing in Moscow as Ronald Reagan during his
first term as president."20
The KGB hunted for compromising material on Reagan and planted articles in Denmark, France, and India during
Reagan's failed 1976 presidential campaign.21 However, during Reagan's 1980 election campaign, the KGB did
not become involved in a major disinformation effort, in part because they saw little difference between a
strongly anti-Soviet Reagan and a Carter administration dominated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's anti-
Soviet national security advisor. It was a decision the KGB would quickly regret. As Andrew and Mitrokhin
wrote, "Ensuring that Reagan did not serve a second term thus became Service A's most important objective."22
On February 25, 1983, KGB headquarters instructed agents in the United States to start planning activities to
defeat Reagan in the 1984 presidential election. Headquarters requested that KGB agents establish contacts on
the staffs of every presidential candidate and in the Republican and Democratic party headquarters. KGB
leaders asked residences abroad to send agents to take part in the operation in the United States. KGB
headquarters made clear that any Republican or Democratic candidate-other than Reagan-would be preferable.23
As one classified CIA report concluded, "Moscow would rather deal with a new administration, even though
uncertain about its actual policies, than carry on with the present [Reagan] one."24 The Soviets'
disinformation campaign was designed to discredit Reagan by labeling him as a warmonger and arguing that re-
electing him would be a grave mistake.25]
On February 25, 1983, KGB headquarters instructed agents in the United States to start planning activities to
defeat Reagan in the 1984 presidential election.
U.S.President and Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy wave to supporters at an
electoral meeting in November 1984. Source: DON RYPKA/AFP/Getty Images
In addition to placing sources inside the campaigns, the KGB worked with front groups and agents of
influence-such as pro-Soviet journalists-in the United States to disparage Reagan. Examples included the
Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) and its front groups, such as the United States Peace Council (USPC) and
the National Council of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF). The Soviets relied on these groups to support
active measures and propaganda campaigns, and KGB officers were in frequent contact with officials from these
groups.26 As the FBI assessed, "[The Soviets] utilized their front organizations and publications to attempt
to convince the U.S. public that the reelection of President Reagan would be a grave mistake and would have
significant political and economic ramifications."27 Inside the United States, the KGB active measures
campaign alleged that Reagan discriminated against minorities, that his administration was corrupt, and that
he was too closely tied to the military-industrial complex. Outside of the United States, the KGB campaign
painted Reagan as a war hawk who was engineering an arms race and catapulting the United States and Soviet
Union toward nuclear Armageddon.28
Reagan officials-along with U.S. intelligence agencies-were acutely aware of KGB planning and activities to
influence the 1984 election. As one classified White House report concluded, "The Administration is harboring
a growing concern about Soviet attempts to intervene in the American election process and the effects this
has on the international climate."29 KGB efforts, the memo pointed out, came on the heels of Soviet attempts
to influence the 1983 election in Germany and Great Britain. For the United States, however, Moscow was
willing to dedicate significant time and money. "Altogether, the Soviets devote a massive amount of resources
to influence American voters over the heads of the government," the memo concluded. "Their activities not
only constitute intervention into the internal affairs of our country, but have done a great deal to
aggravate the international climate."30 A classified CIA assessment concluded that the Soviet grasp of the
U.S. political system had improved over the years, which meant that "the Soviet capacity for influencing
[American] votes is higher."31
As the KGB discovered following Reagan's landslide victory in 1984, however, its ability to influence a
popular president was limited. But it didn't stop them from trying to influence U.S. politics in the late
1980s. As one FBI report concluded, "Soviet intelligence officers have already started to collect information
on the 1988 Presidential candidates and their positions on various issues." These operations targeted
"Congressmen and other elected officials by front organizations, agents of influence, Soviet influenced
organizations, and the CPUSA."32
By the early 1990s, however, Russian active measures went into a deep thaw as the Soviet Union collapsed, the
KGB was in disarray, and Moscow lost its Warsaw Pact allies to the expansion of NATO and the European Union.
Back to the Future
The Mueller report's conclusion that Russia was involved in an aggressive influence campaign against the
United States at home and abroad is deeply concerning. But it needs to be viewed as a continuation of
Moscow's strategic competition with the United States. Nearly three decades after the Soviet Union's breakup,
Vladimir Putin is attempting to re-establish Russia as a global power and compete with the United States.
An FBI assessment of KGB active measures, released in 1987, is just as relevant today as it was then in its
explanation of Moscow's goals:
Although it is often difficult to judge the effectiveness of specific active measures operations, the Soviets
believe these operations have a cumulative effect and are detrimental to U.S. foreign policy and national
security interests. Furthermore, the Soviets believe that their active measures operations in the United
States do contribute to their overall strategy to advance Soviet foreign policy interests, influence U.S.
government policies, and in general discredit the United States.33
Russia's campaign before, during, and after the 2016 election suggests several themes. First, it is an
interesting historical twist that Moscow shifted its active measures campaign from demonizing Republican
candidates to supporting a Republican presidential nominee in Donald Trump. To be clear, Moscow has never
been motivated per se by U.S. political parties, but rather supported U.S. presidential candidates,
politicians, and issues that Russian leaders assessed would benefit its policies. As one classified White
House memo concluded in 1984, "The principal method by which the Soviets attempt to influence American voters
is by campaigning against the candidate and the Party they don't like."34 This is just as true today. Moscow
apparently concluded that Trump was more friendly to Russia and its policies than Hillary Clinton. Americans
should see Russian actions for what they are: an effort to increase their influence at America's expense.
Moscow has never been motivated per se by U.S. political parties, but rather supported U.S. presidential
candidates, politicians, and issues that Russian leaders assessed would benefit its policies.
Second, Russian active measures today are about much more than the 2016 U.S. election. They are about
strategic balance-of-power competition with the United States. Russia employs a mix of technologically-
sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities, covert action, and information operations in an attempt to expand
its power and compete with the United States. Moscow has implemented overt information campaigns using
platforms like RT and Sputnik. It has also conducted covert campaigns to support influential figures and
opposition political parties in the United States and Europe; waged offensive cyber campaigns against the
United States, France, Germany, and other NATO countries; and supported proxies in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, and
Afghanistan to increase its power in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and even Africa. In 2019, Russia even
deployed soldiers and provided military equipment to Venezuela, a country that has historically been in
Washington's sphere of influence dating back to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.
U.S. national security documents have highlighted Russian goals. The U.S. National Defense Strategy, for
example, notes that the United States is engaged in inter-state competition with countries like China and
Russia. "Russia," it argues, "seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their
governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor."35The Director of National
Intelligence's 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessments bluntly concluded that: "Threats to US national security
will expand and diversify in the coming year, driven in part by China and Russia as they respectively compete
more intensely with the United States and its traditional allies and partners."36 The Mueller report's
conclusions support these assessments.
Third, Moscow likely believes its intelligence efforts today are helping undermine U.S. foreign and domestic
policy by exploiting a polarized American political climate, exacerbating U.S. fissures with its allies in
Europe and Asia, and contributing to a decline in American global power and influence. The United States
needs to avoid devolving into the hysteria of the McCarthy years during the 1950s, which included a broad
campaign against alleged Communists in the U.S. government and other institutions carried out under Senator
Joseph McCarthy. Yet there are legitimate threats from countries like Russia and China. It is striking and
unfortunate that U.S. leaders, including the U.S. president, have not vowed to aggressively respond to
Russian meddling in U.S. domestic politics based on the Mueller findings. Without a tough response, like
Reagan did during the Cold War, it is unlikely that Moscow will be deterred from interfering again in the
future.
The Mueller report highlights that the United States faces a range of threats from adversaries like Russia-
along with others, like China. These U.S. adversaries are undemocratic; their populations have little or no
say in electing leaders. Their officials support state-run economies, not free markets. Their governments
control the media and abhor a free press. And they are directly challenging a U.S.-led international order
since World War II that has been committed to free market international economic institutions, bilateral and
regional security organizations, and democratic political norms.
U.S. enemies are not just at the gate, they are inside it. Americans need to put aside party policies and
confront these threats to freedom and democracy.
CSIS collected these and other declassified U.S. government documents on Soviet interference in U.S.
elections from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, and the CIA Records Search
Tool (CREST) database at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.
? Memorandum from John Lenczowski to John M. Poindexter, Subject: Statement on Soviet Intervention in the
U.S. Electoral Process, August 16, 1984, USSR (8/16/84-8/18/84), Box 25A, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country
File: Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.
? Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87," CIA-
RDP11M01338R000400470089-2, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration, College
Park, MD.
? Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Soviet Expectations for the U.S. Presidential
Election," January 31, 1984, CIA-RDP85T00287R001400370002-7, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and
Records Administration, College Park, MD.
? Memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE to the Director of Central Intelligence and
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Soviets Playing on U.S. Election, August 1, 1984, CIA-
RDP86M0086R001000010026-5, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration, College
Park, MD.
? Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: The Soviets and the 1984 U.S. Elections,
October 28, 1982, CIA-RDP85T00153R000300020043-0, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park, MD.
Seth G. Jones is the Harold Brown Chair and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is the author, most recently, of "A Covert Action: Reagan, the
CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland" (W.W. Norton).
The author gives special thanks to Jacob Ware and Nicholas Harrington for assistance in collecting and
analyzing data.
This brief is made possible by the generous support of CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this
report.
CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt
institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary.
CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in
this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
1Letter from Attorney General William P. Barr to the Honorable Lindsey Graham, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein, the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, and the Honorable Doug Collins, March 24, 2019.
2Ibid.
3Memorandum from John Lenczowski to John M. Poindexter, Subject: Statement on Soviet Intervention in the U.S.
Electoral Process, August 16, 1984, USSR (8/16/84-8/18/84), Box 25A, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Coun-try
File: Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 3.
4"Report by the Chairman of the Delegation of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, General-
Colonel V.M. Chebrikov during Soviet Bloc Meeting on Western Radio," April 23, 1980, History and Public
Policy Program Digital Archive, Cold War International History Project,
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121522 . Also see "Soviet Active Measures," Hearings Before
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, July 13, 14, 1982 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 231.
5Statement of John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Covert
Action (The Forgery Offensive)," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, February 6, 19, 1980 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980), 6.
6United States Department of State, Sov iet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda,
1986-1987 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, August 1987), viii.
7See, for example, the testimony of former KGB operative Stanislav Levchenko in "Soviet Active Measures," in
"Soviet Active Measures," Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
8Statement of Ladislav Bittman, Former Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak
Intelligence Service, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 43-44.
9Interagency Intelligence Study, "Soviet Active Measures," included in "Soviet Active Measures," Hearings
Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
10"Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 30. Emphasis added.
11See, for example, "A Directive form the Centre," Folder 79, The Chekist Anthology, April 25, 1974, History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to Cold War International History Project by Vasili
Mitrokhin.
12Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda," 1980, available in "Soviet Covert
Action (The Forgery Offensive)," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, 60; Statement of John McMahon, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 7.
13As one CIA analyst concluded: "There is a precedent for the stand-down during a period of high détente."
Testimony of James R. Benjamin available in Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery
Offensive)," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
14Statement of Ladislav Bittman, Former Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak
Intelligence Service, ibid., 37-38.
15Testimony of James R. Benjamin, ibid.
16Statement of Ladislav Bittman, Former Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak
Intelligence Service, ibid., 51.
17Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Random
House, 1995), 176. Emphasis added.
18See, for example, Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Roots of Meddling in U.S. Politics," PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo
No. 452, January 2017, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm452
_Kramer_Jan2017.pdf.
19Mitrokhin Archives, vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1. Available in the Churchill Archives at Churchill College,
Cambridge, UK.
20Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret
History of the KGB (New York: Basic Book, 1999), 243.
21Mitrokhin Archives, vol. 6, app. 1, parts 27, 32. Available in the Churchill Archives at Churchill College,
Cambridge, UK. Also see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 242.
22Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 243. Emphasis added.
23Ibid.
24Memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE to the Director of Central Intelligence and
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Soviets Playing on U.S. Election, August 1, 1984, CIA-
RDP86M0086R001000010026-5, CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration, College
Park, MD [hereafter CREST].
25Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87," CIA-
RDP11M01338R000400470089-2, CREST.
26Memorandum from Nicholas Platt to VADM John M. Poindexter, Subject: Report to Congress on Soviet and
Communist Disinformation and Press Manipulation, August 9, 1986, [Project Truth, Project Democracy, Public
Diplomacy and NED, 7/86-8/86], Box 7, Walter Raymond files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library [hereafter
RRPL].
27"Soviet Active Measures in the United States-an Updated Report by the FBI," Congressional Record, December
9, 1987, available at CIA-RDP11M01338R000400470089-2, CREST.
28Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 243.
29Memorandum from John Lenczowski to John M. Poindexter, Subject: Statement on Soviet Intervention in the
U.S. Electoral Process, August 16, 1984, USSR (8/16/84-8/18/84), Box 25A, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country
File: Records, RRPL.
30bid.
31Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: The Soviets and the 1984 U.S. Elections,
October 28, 1982, CIA-RDP85T00153R000300020043-0, CREST.
32Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87," CIA-
RDP11M01338R000400470089-2, CREST.
33Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Soviet Active Measures in the United States, 1986-87," CREST.
34Memorandum from Lenczowski to Poindexter, August 16, 1984, RRPL.
35 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Defense, 2018), 2.
36Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of
the Director of National Intelligence), 4.
=====
AlleyCat is one of the several people who dominate Rudy on a daily basis, keeping their bootheels on his
little pencil neck to the amusement of all.
Rudy's psychosis is characterized by an impaired relationship with reality.
It's a symptom of serious mental disorders. People who are experiencing
psychosis may have delusions.
The person experiencing psychosis may also have thoughts that are contrary to
actual EVIDENCE.
These thoughts are known as delusions. Some people with psychosis may also
experience loss of motivation and social withdrawal.
(like spending ALL day on Usenet, instead of socially interacting)
These experiences can be frightening. They may also cause people who are
experiencing psychosis to hurt themselves or others.
"I can kill you with one hand. You know this."
"Thanks for kicking my faggot ass."
"I've beaten you to a bloody pulp"
"... you you no-fight faggot."
"Kicked your flabby faggot ass again. Yes."
It's important to see a doctor right away if you or someone you know is
experiencing symptoms of psychosis.
Symptoms of psychosis include:
depressed mood
sleeping too much or not enough
anxiety
suspiciousness
withdrawal from family and friends
delusions
disorganized speech, such as switching topics erratically
depression
suicidal thoughts or actions
A delusion is a false belief or impression that is firmly held even though it's
contradicted by reality and what is commonly considered true. There are
delusions of paranoia, grandiose delusions, and somatic delusions.
People who are experiencing a delusion of paranoia might think that they are
being followed when they aren't or that secret messages are being sent to them.
Someone with a grandiose delusion will have an exaggerated sense of importance.
Somatic delusion is when a person believes they have a terminal illness, but in
reality they're healthy.